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1
THE MESSY WORLD WE INHABIT

AUGUST 1, 2007, the entire truss structure of the I -35W Bridge over
the Mississippi River at Minneapolis, Minnesota, collapsed during the
morning rush hour. 1 The horrifying catastrophe was over in just seconds.
In the end, the disaster claimed the lives of thirteen motorists and injured
145 others. A series oflawsuits followed until finally, two years later, on
August 23,2010, the last lawsuit was settled, to the tune of$52.4 million.
Subsequent to this spectacular engineering failure, no one was surprised that lawsuits were filed, and won or lost. Yet we wished it were not
always so. Both engineering designs on the one hand, and their design
contexts on the other hand, can be "bad" without there being a question
of assigning blame. Granted, sometimes failure can be blan1ed on human
error. And we readily admit that once the finger has been pointed and the
offending culprit penalized, people tend to feel just a little bit better about
the disaster, as though the weight has been lifted just a little. But can blame
always be assigned? And if not, why do we assume that it can?
The habit of seeking someone to blame for engineering failures
springs from a deep-seated temptation to view the world through an
ideal lens. This temptation infects engineer and non-engineer alike. Yet
for students of engineering, the temptation to think in an ideal mode can
be made more acute by their exposure to certain aspects of the first- and
second-year engineering curriculum. We will call these features, and the
outlook produced, "ideal-world thinking:' Eventually, the very best engineering students unlearn ideal -world thinking, or at least learn to temper
it with strong doses of skeptical realism. But in the meantime, ideal-world
thinking hinders excellence in engineering and misleads ethical conversation. So, before we can get a handle on engineering ethics, we must begin
ON
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by comparing the ideal world to the "messy world;' which is to say, the
world in which we actually live.

THE 1DEAL WoRLD

Take a good look at Figure 1.1. Gear A rotates at a speed of 3.6n rad/sec.
Wh
will p be one
.
..
h
At time t , a point (P) 1s at the pos1t10n as s own.
ere
0

minute later, at t 60?

Gear B, 13 teeth

Gear A, 53 teeth
FIGURE

1.1 Calculating e for P602

For most readers, the calculation is very straightforward. The ratio
between the gears is 53:13. Sixty revolutions of Gear A will correspond to
(60 x 53)/13 revolutions of Gear B. Since whole revolutions can be dis3180
counted (all were after is the position of P relative to the x-axis),
/1 3
will produce the same value for P 60 as 8 / 13 rotation. This rotation must be
We can tell from the diagram that p 0 is I I 13 of a turn
subtracted from
in the counterclockwise direction (2n/13 rad or 360/13°). So, if this were
an exam, we could safely predict the final position of P 60 to be (2n/1 3)
- (8(2n)/13) = -7(2n)/13 rad or 6(2n)/13 rad, if we measure in the conventional counterclockwise direction (approx 166°).
But hold on a minute. Haven't we shifted into calculation mode a
bit too quickly? Where did this problem come from? Are we so familiar
with textbooks that in rushing to fi.nd the answer, we may forget that an

eo.

e

e

2

The Messy World We Inhabit

engineering problem has a specific context in the real world where things
can bind, bend, break off, melt, and so on? 3 The diagram looks official
enough as the above magnification (Figure 1.1b) shows. In fact, it was
generated by a program that takes almost no account of the physical limits
of actual gear trains as well as the conventions of manufacturing. For example, it is standard to design gears with non-prime numbers of teeth. A
gear train with prime numbered teeth can be built, but these are not stock
and therefore would have to be special ordered. So why are the numbers
of teeth in this particular diagram prime numbers (13, 53)? Is there a very
peculiar and particular application behind this problem? (There is, actually. More on that later in the chapter.)
In addition to manufacturing conventions, a kinematician looking
at this diagram spotted something else as well. The shape of the teeth is
common enough- perhaps a zoo pressure angle. But there turn out to
be physical limits to how few teeth can be meshed with 53 teeth without
interference. For a zoo pressure angle, that number is 16. With 13 teeth as
drawn, the interference will be such that the gears lock up.

Figure l.lb Detail of Custom Gear Train (53:13)
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To prevent interference, the teeth of the smaller gear must be "undercut" -indented a bit so as to allow the corners of the big gear teeth to
rotate past as the gears turn. Undercutting gears may have an effect on
load, since the smaller teeth are weakened. Real-world designers must ask,
"What does the problem as posed presume about the load to be placed on
this gear train?"
Okay, suppose we follow the standard methodology for gear train
design and replace Figure 1.1 with the following stock gears.

Gear 1, 52 teeth
FIGURE

1.2 A "Stock'' Gear Train (52: 16)

Are we ready to solve? Maybe. Even the naked eye may be able to
see that the "off the shelf" gears of Figure 1.2 appear to need undercutting. Moreover, we still don't know what kind of problem we are facing.
Is Figure 1.2 simply a thought experiment? Or is it a proposed design for
some application in the real world where things bind, bend, break off,
melt, and so on? If the application is real, we must ask: is the speed of
Gear A at t0 real or merely assumed? Perhaps a client gave specs on the
basis of assumptions rather than facts. This wouldn't be the first client to
have insisted on faulty specs! If we are intending to solve on the basis of
the unverified assumptions of a client, then we are once again forgetting

4
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to be engineers, because engineers must pose a host of clarifying questions
to the client:
Is the motor that drives Gear A running at t0 or is it at rest?
How long does it take for Gear A to achieve 108 rpm (i.e., 3.67! rad/
sec)? After how many revolutions can acceleration be ignored?
How much "play" is in each bearing? If the bearings are liable to human adjustments, is there too much or too little play? Or is the play
"just right" - as is the case with sealed bearings? Similarly, if the bearings are adjustable, then are the bearings adequately lubricated? (Or
are we using sealed bearings?)
•

How great a load is on the motor? After all, 108 rpm is quite slow as
far as motors go. Is this a fast motor being made to work slowly by a
large load? If so, bearing wear over time may be an important factor
as t increases.

•

Does the load vary?
What is the temperature of the surrounding medium? What is the
turbulence of the surrounding medium?
Is the mechanism underwater? Underwater?! The diagram says nothing about the mechanism being underwater. But do clients always
volunteer all the crucial details? Or do engineers need to extract pertinent information from sometimes unwitting clients?
And so on . . .

These questions seem like trick questions, even traps. For asking
questions like these, engineers are often branded as "glass-half-empty"
pessimists. But in the real world, gear trains are not ideal. To think they
are ideal would be to make a huge mistake. ("Real" is the actual, everyday
world we live in where things bind, scorch, melt, break off, and generally
fall apart. Mathematics may be used to approximate the real world- and
not the other way around.)
For example, in 1986 General Electric switched from reciprocal
compressors to rotary compressors in their refrigerators. They made the
switch knowing that rotary compressors require more power and operate at higher speeds. But GE presumed that even at these higher speeds,
rotary action was inherently closer to an "ideal" than reciprocal action
and therefore inherently better. This sounds almost as if GE assumed rotary compressors behave ideally, as if they perfectly mimicked a technical
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drawing of contextless gear trains comprised of frictionless revolute joints.
Technicians reported no failures during the testing phase. But when the
techs said that something about the new compressors "didn't look right
either;' GE decision-makers roundly ignored the lowly techs. Eventually
these compressors did begin to fail. Twelve short months after one million
refrigerators had been sold, the long-term effects of operating at higher
speeds (and thus higher temperatures) became painfully visible: compressors bound, melted, broke, and burned out. It cost GE $450,000,000 to
replace the defective compressors.4
Back to our ideal gear train in Figure 1.1. When facing the problem
oflocating Pat t60 , one student will answer "8 = 6(2n)l13 rad:' Another interrupts with a string of questions. Which student gives the better response
to the problem? Well, doesn't it depend on who is doing the asking and
under what conditions? If we are in the classroom, we know that the ideal
case can be diagrammed: point masses, frictionless bearings, instantaneous acceleration, infinitely solid grounding for revolute joints, etc. The
ideal case has a single true answer, "For w = 3.6n rad/sec, P60 is shown to
bee= 6(2n)/13 rad:' This answer can be delivered with certitude, because
the ideal mechanism follows mathematically precise rules. These rules
govern the ideal device with complete authority. In the ideal case, there
is no wobble in the bearings because the bearings are completely snug yet
frictionless. And yet . ..

IDEAL - WoRLD

ErH ICS?

Some people think, mistakenly in my book, that ethics is like the study
of the rules governing the ideal mechanism. For these thinkers, a great
deal of effort has gone into explicating the rules-even with mathematical
precision, wherever possible. On this view, the job of the professional ethicist is to answer questions such as, "If human interaction is like an ideal
mechanism, what rules govern person-to-person interactions?" Of course,
human beings are not really mechanisms, and they concede that human
interactions will sometimes deviate from the ideal, especially when they
fail to follow the rules. But can ethics be modeled on the ideal? To find out,
let's take a closer look at one of these ideal-world models.
One proposed rule is this: human beings are obligated to behave in
the manner that maximizes the likelihood of yielding the most quantifiable beneficial consequence for the greatest number of people. This rule,
"maximize net quantifiable goodness;' is given by a series of calculations:
6
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n.
X

Net G =

~ (likelihood)(goodness)(significance)

1
1

EQUATION 1.1: Calculating Net Goodness for course of action x, where n
= the number of outcomes for course of action x, and 1=likelihood, g =
goodness, and s = significance of each given outcome n
Suppose the boss has moved up a deadline that I was already struggling to meet. If I'm to stay on pace, I'll necessarily have to work longer
hours than I'm already working- longer into the evenings (forget about
my kids' soccer games) and big chunks of the weekend (forget about
that anniversary getaway). On first thought four courses of action seem
possible. I can (a) work the hours and take the lumps with my spouse
and children; (b) appeal to workmates to help with my present task in
exchange for the promise to help them out in the future; (c) say to the
boss, "As you wish!" but in reality make no adjustments and simply fail
to make deadline (perhaps I can apologize for this later); or (d) stridently
refuse the boss's request, underlining my feelings by punching the boss in
the nose. If these are my possible courses of action, then in the terms of
the formula, x = 4.
Each course of action will have consequences of varying degrees of
likelihood. For example, we can imagine that d (punch the boss in the
nose) may result in one or more of the following: (1) I get fired; (2) I'm
sued for bodily injury; (3) I break my hand; (4) I feel really good about
myself; (5) I'm admired by my colleagues, who go on strike in solidarity
with me until the boss is fired and I am promoted as the new boss. For this
course of action (punching the boss), the possible number of outcomes
listed is five (n = 5).
For each of these three outcomes a likelihood (l) is predicted and assigned a numerical value (such as "a 75 percent chance of occurrence:')
The goodness (g) of an outcome is a simple binary quantity: + 1 if it is a
good thing, -1 if it is a bad thing. 5 In the case of punching the boss, the
first three outcomes listed are bad, or -1, but the last two are good, or+ 1.
Finally, the significance of the outcome is assigned a numerical ranking, say 1 for something trivial and 10 for something of grave importance.
Getting fired is pretty serious- but not as bad as dying or being sued. So,
perhaps we'll give it an 8. Being sued is worse than getting fired (since
7
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it goes on my permanent record), but not as bad as dying. So a 9 seems
about right. Breaking one or more fingers is painful and inconvenient, but
not as severe as losing the job. Let's give it a significance level of 5. Feeling
good about myself is pleasant, but not more pleasant than a broken hand
is painful; let's say a 3. Finally, my promotion into the place of my former
boss is pretty sweet, maybe even a 9% out of 10.
The likelihood of being fired is probably 90 percent or better; the
chance of being sued depends on the boss's personality- let's say 75 percent. And the risk of breaking my hand stands at about 50- 50. The chances
of feeling temporarily very good are extremely high - the adrenalin rush
virtually guarantees (100 percent) a brief elation. But the solidarity of my
peers resulting in my promotion is extremely unlikely; let's say on the order of a 2 percent chance. Now we can do the math:
Net G for Action,1 = (-1)(8)(.90)+( -1)(9)(.75)+( -1)(5)(.50)+(1)(3)
(1.0)+(1)(9.5)(.02) = -13.26
Of course we are only one-fourth the way done. Ifi can only think of
four possible courses of action, then x = 4 and I will generate four different
calculations, four different Net G's. Thus the calculation must be repeated
for the other three courses of action. Let's try one more calculation, say for
Course of Action 1, a.k.a. "do the work but take the lumps at home:' Four
possible outcomes: keep my job (+8 at 100 percent); my wife takes the kids
and leaves me (-9.9 at 10 percent); I am fined by the city for not mowing
my lawn in a timely fashion (-2 at 15 percent); and having to cook for
myself in my wife's absence, I lose 20 lbs. (+5 at 60 percent).
Net G for Action 1 = (+ 1)(8)(1.0)+( -1)(9.9)(.10)+( -1)(2)(.15)+(1)(5)
(.6) = +0.8
After having carefully calculated the outcomes for these two courses
of action, the obligatory thing to do according to this brand of consequentialism (called "utilitarianism") is to give in to the boss and take my lumps
on the home front. Why is this the "best" option? Because 0.8 > -13.26.
One can see that if the scales are the same in each case (i.e., I ranges
from 0 to 100 percent, g = + 1 or -1, and s ranges from 1 to 10 ), then the
goodness of an outcome can be quantitatively compared to other outcomes
predicted for taking this course of action. The result of summing these
values is the net G for that course of action. This string of calculations is
repeated for each possible course of action; the course of action with the
biggest total "wins;' which is to say- or so this theory claims- the one
with the biggest total is revealed to be the morally obligatory course to take.
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OBJECTIONS TO THE ID EAL-WO RLD MODEL OF ETH ICS

Of course, there are bow1d to be enormous problems with the quantification of moral value. After all, likelihood is terrifically difficult to predict in
advance. Why? Because we do not live in an ideal world, but in a complex
and chaotic one. "Complexity" and "chaos" are technical terms that mean
no physical system, especially no living system, is entirely predictable. 6
This is not the same as saying nothing is predictable. (The flight of a baseball is pretty nearly a parabola.) The key term is entirely. Saying that no
physical system is entirely predictable means that prognostication runs
up against a limit_? But those who insist on thinking in ideal terms resist
this conclusion and instead concoct ways for dismissing all the W1knowns.
The most common strategy for dealing with unknowns in a decisionmaking scheme is to restrict the calculation to outcomes with a fixed likelihood, usually those conceded as certain (I = 100 percent). "This strategy
means that the entire burden of comparative reasoning falls upon correctly ranking the relative significance (s) of each outcome. Of course, the
idealists must be careful: assigning rankings can itself be a way to beat the
odds. Since numerical rankings mathematically guarantee the conclusion,
one might be tempted to play around with them until one gets what is
wanted. In hopes of safeguarding against cheats, the idealists insist that the
ranking be performed in the most publicly accessible denominator known
to humankind: money.
Remember, the idealists want to perform a calculation of Net Goodness. If goodness is a simple + 1 or -1, and likelihood is fixed at 100 percent,
then the only remaining difficulty is in measuring significance. Unfortunately, in hedging the system against tmpredictability and cheats, idealist
decision-makers have inserted economics into the fray. The problem is
this: Is market value a genuine measure of significance? Philosopher Caroline Whitbeck points out that we regularly do make various kinds of value
judgments; "Van Gogh is a good painter;' "Godel's proof is a good one;'
"Reading the Bible is good for you:' No doubt, each of these claims will
have its objectors. Nevertheless, each claim is fully intelligible. We readily
understand, and just as readily argue over, aesthetic, logical, and religious
value claims. But as Whitbeck points out, none of these value claims translate into dollar signs. Van Gogh was a good painter before his paintings
sold for millions.
Here's the rub: Ascribing monetary "value" is really not an ascription
of value. Monetary "value" does not reflect value; it only reflects what the

9
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economic market can bear. That being the case, the reliance on monetary
value may lead one astray who attempts to perform a calculation for Net
Goodness (as per Equation 1.1). Famously, in the late 1970s defense attorneys for Ford Motor Company argued that the corporation was blameless
in the burn deaths resulting from exploding gasoline tanks in Pinto cars
and light trucks. 8 They employed Equation 1 to make the case that Ford
did exactly what the numbers obliged them to do: nothing.
The legal case boiled down to two courses of action: (1) recall and
repair 11 million Pintos, and 1.5 million light trucks with the same design, by installing a bladder in the gas tank costing a measly $11, or (2) do
nothing and settle each lawsuit for wrongful death and property loss on a
case-by-case basis. Let's do the numbers:
Outcomes (n = 3)

Likelihood

180 burn deaths

NetG 1

Goodness

Significance

100 percent

-1

$200,000

-$36M

180 serious burn injuries

100 percent

-1

$67,000

-$12M

2,100 damaged vehicles

100 percent

-1

$700

-$1.5 M

NetG =

-$49.5 M

FIGURE 1.3 Course of Action 1: Do Nothing

Outcomes (n = 2)

Likelihood

Goodness

Significance

NetG 2

11 million cars

100 percent

-1

$11

-$122M

1.5 million light trucks

100 percent

-1

$11

-$16.5 M

NetG=

-$137.5 M

FIGURE 1.4 Course of Action 2: Recall and Repair with $11 Tank Bladder

Astute readers often wonder whether the attorneys lowballed the
numbers. And why were only two courses of action considered? Surely
multiple courses of action were open to Ford once it learned of the design
flaw. But for the moment, let's stay focused on whether "value" can be measured in dollars. In the Pinto case, the market supplied the data for both
the value of a used Pinto ($700) and human loss of life ($200,000). When
adjusted for inflation, 9 the approximate value of life in today's dollars
would have been placed at $635,000. This figure pales in comparison to the
present market value of human life established by the EPA: $9,100,000! 10

10
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Had Ford used the tenfold higher "value" in its calculations, it would have
concluded that the morally obligatory course of action was to recall and
repair all the tanks. (Just the 180 burn deaths at $7.9 million produces a
negative quantity of $1.4 billion, which is almost ten times more than the
cost of fixing the tanks!) As it was, Ford used the 1978 market value for life
and concluded that, morally speaking, they were in the clear.
Such discrepancy doesn't sit well with us. My older brother owned a
Pinto back in the late seventies. Can I really believe that Ford would have
been blameless had he died in 1978 but guilty if he had died in 2010 simply
because the market value for his life had increased? Of course not. Our
instinct is completely correct- loss of life is always an inestimably bad
thing regardless of the market's price tag. (Nevertheless, culture asks engineering firms to move forward with designs that are merely "safe enough:'
A maximally safe airplane could never get off the ground.)
Equation 1.1 is called consequentialist because it is concerned with
the outcomes or consequences of a given moral decision. When one uses
it to help make a moral decision, one has to deal frankly with the inherent uncertainties of the equation. The form of the equation used by Ford's
attorneys is called cost-benefit analysis. As we have seen, it discounts
uncertainty in the likelihood column by considering only those outcomes
that can be conceded as given (l = 100 percent). An alternative strategy for
dealing with uncertainty in the equation is to fix the significance column
(s) instead of the likelihood. In other words, instead of conceding that
certain outcomes are bound to happen and then assign a market value to
each outcome, the alternative focuses on only one outcome- for example,
loss of life- and then works to give precision to prediction of likelihood.
Accuracy in prediction is attainable only when vast pools of data are available. For example, actuaries working for large insurance companies can
show that the statistical chance of a red car crashing is slightly higher than
the chance of a blue one crashing. No one knows for sure why. But given
the millions of crashes by blue and red cars, the statistical difference in
their rate of incidence is not negligible. This approach is called risk-benefit
analysis. Risk-benefit analysis avoids the problem of "market value" because it is based on real-world data rather than the fluctuation of markets.
Unfortunately, risk-benefit analysis cheats on the other end of the spectrum by severely restricting itself to immediate (or at least short-range)
outcomes. But is this inherently more fair than the kind of confusion that
"market value" injects?

11
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Imagine a biologist considering taking a vacation cruise in the Indian Ocean. Socially minded fanatical friends urge the biologist not to go.
Rather, they plead, the biologist ought to cash in her tickets and donate
the money to relief efforts for the 1.5 million refugees still (in 2011) left
homeless as a result of the 2009 Haitian earthquake. Ordinarily, we would
say that the surrender of the price of one's vacation to charity is a noble
deed. Such a gift might conceivably save many human lives. By lowering
incidents of death, the risk-benefit form of the equation decrees that giving
away the cruise money is even the obligatory thing to do.
But wait a minute. It is also conceivable, though in no way knowable,
that a much-needed vacation might have a more beneficial longer-range
result. Perhaps while the cruise ship is anchored in the bay, the biologist
takes a day trip to the coast that brings her into contact with the farming
practices of a local people, which in turn redirects her own research, resulting in the production of a pesticide that vastly increases grain harvests
and feeds many more people than could have been fed by the surrender of
the price of her ticket. 11 What I have done here is reminiscent of the work
of ethicist Bernard Williams, who was fond of complicating apparently
straightforward ethical calculations by the telling of simple, but realistic,
stories about how we really live. 12 All such realistic tales remind us that
the very best moral reasoning must consider the intangibles- those factors that we can neither predict in advance nor easily place a value upon,
perhaps because they are longer-ranged than can be presently seen. ·
Williams's point about the importance of including such intangibles
becomes persuasive when we consider the messy world that we live in with
all its hurly-burly. But if we slip into thinking of the world in terms of ideal
mechanisms, we may unwittingly overlook some of the very most important factors. Given the innumerable ways things can bind, melt, or break
off, it seems unlikely that a good analogy for real-world ethics is that of an
ideal mechanism. Fortunately, there is another way. As we shall see, this
way is much closer to real-world engineering than to an ideal mechanism.

THE MESSY WORLD

Consider a second mechanical example, that of a Bianchi racing bicycle
ridden by a fortysomething male competing in "Ride the Bear;' a 105-mile
road race over the highest paved road in Southern California. The problem of pressure angle disappears because the gear train has been replaced
by chain and sprocket.
12
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FIGURE

1.5 Bianchi Racing Bicycle with Rear Cassette Ratio 53:13

The ratio between the two sprockets is the same as in Figure 1.1, although in this case another member (the 700 mm wheel) has been added
to the train. (In addition, the chain drive means that the rear cassette
[sprocket] rotates counterclockwise, matching that of the chain ring.) The
front chain ring has 53 teeth, which gives the racer a slight advantage on
the flats over rivals who ride models that typically have 52-teeth chain
rings. A smaller chain ring is available for climbing hills (it has 42 teeth;
real bikers sneer at a 39-teeth chain ring-a.k.a. "Granny gear" -even for
steep mountain climbs!).
Owners of racing bikes also have options for the sizes of their rear
sprocket set (cassette). An easy set has sprockets with 25-23-21-19-17-15
teeth. The largest sprocket (25) makes for easier uphill climbing. Similarly,
a set with much smaller ratios (e.g., 21-19-17-15-13-11-9 teeth) will give
the rider more downhill velocity but will be more difficult to pedal. The 2321-19-17-15-13 set on this particular Bianchi was a good compromise for
me. As the owner of this seafoam-green Bianchi, I had the entire middle
range of ratios covered and had no problem climbing aggressively (fortyfive miles of "The Bear" was uphill). But my top speed was capped at 52
mph. Unless I was in free fall, I could only go as fast as I could spin; and
it was physically impossible for my then fortysomething body to exceed a
short-burst cadence of 145 rpms (which for 700 mm tires and a maximum
gear ratio of 53:13 produced P ove = 52 mph).

13
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Seen from the view of a cyclist, none of the interrupting questions
raised about the ideal gear train in Figure 1.1 are insignificant. The "load"
on the "motor" is constantly varying as terrain shifts. So, "instant acceleration" was impossible, as was steady cadence (w ;we only approximates 220n
rad/min.). Friction is constantly the enemy. Having one's bottom bracket
properly adjusted for optimum range of play was crucially important. (Had
my Bianchi not been a classic, I'd have opted in a heartbeat for the modern
sealed-bearing bottom bracket.) Bearings are always in danger of binding
and overheating and scoring their races. The ticking noise that developed
in my bottom bracket was not only the symptom of its eventual demise;
it also reminded me that this was not a frictionless system I was pedaling.
Air temperature- which in Southern Cal could easily top 100°F- was important data to consider when strategizing how to keep the human "motor" from overheating. (Overheating from lack of water was obviously of
greater concern than "bonking;' or "hitting the wall;' which results from
lack of food. When both aerobic and anaerobic fuel have been digested,
the body begins to digest itself.) Ironically, when we reached Lake Arrowhead, almost a vertical mile higher than the start, the temperature was
in the low 40s) . Nor were air speeds negligible. Obviously, if ambient air is
still, racers create their own headwind. But with the added bluster of the
seasonal Santa Anas, the gusts of which top 50 mph, keeping one's balance was almost as challenging as making headway. (When the Santa Anas
swept down Devil's Canyon during an earlier training ride, I had to stand
up in first gear on the flats .) And stability of the "motor mounts" are of no
small consequence: when my head tube tore in half (apparently a failure
long in the making) on a particularly steep training ride, my "motor" lost
perhaps one-third of its climbing power, since I could no longer pull on
my handle bars nor safely throw the frame from side to side.
All questions about context, which rudely interrupt so-called ideal
design, are parameters that cannot be ignored if one wants to be a happy
biker. "Happy" or "successful" or "good" cycling has only minimally to do
with "rules" (obey traffic laws; be courteous to fellow riders by pointing
out road debris when they are drafting, etc.). Moreover, happy cycling also
has relatively little to do with the principles that have been extrapolated
for the ideal mechanism. 13 But it has everything to do with real-world
messiness: incompletely described scenarios littered with imperfect data
and ever-changing conditions. This messiness is the terrain that all human beings share. Mechanical engineering prof Billy V. Koen says that
coping with the messiness of the real world makes us all "engineers" of a

14
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sort. Human reasoning is none other than the engineering method. Thus
Koen describes the engineering method as "a strategy for causing the best
change in a poorly understood situation within the available resources:' 14
In this book we are going to scrap the idea of ethics as the ideal case
and look at ethics as something messier. Ethics is more like the real-world
activity of designing and racing bicycles than it is calculating for p 60 on
a technical drawing. But we must be careful! At every step along the way,
we will be sorely tempted by the sheer attractive simplicity of the "ideal"
case. One way to counter this temptation is to constantly force ourselves
to "look and see:' We must always ask ourselves, "What is really going on
here?"
For example, think of how engineering students are initially taught
design. At least on the first pass, design is typically taught as a straight-line
process. From the textbook diagrams it is easy to imagine that one turns
the crank at one end and out pops the innovation at the other end. Consider Figure 1.6 on the following page, depicting the "science" of design
from a standard text.

e
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Conceptualization
Analysis

Distribution

FIGURE

1.6 A Typical Diagram Depicting the "Science" of Design 15

Now, to be fair to the professors, it is common practice to initiate students into new material with ideal types and later ramp up the complexity
of description as students get a more realistic grip on things. (Hopefully,
you have already met some of these correctives in your more advanced
coursework.) Notice in this diagram that the design process is laid out like
a production sequence on an assembly line. Because we are already prone
to interpret technical drawings as ideal machines, to use such a diagram of
the design process misleads some into thinking that design is analogous to
an ideal mechanism (predictable, clear boundaries, etc.).
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As they learn, students hopefully graduate to better diagrams, ones
that depict the interaction between "stages" as bidirectional, with double
arrows indicating feedback loops from subsequent stages.16 At one point
in his publishing, Stuart Pugh used something like the following diagram
to convey the design process.

Design

MARKET ANALYSISI
Specific
Formulation

SYNTHES IS]
CONCEPTUAL DESIGN

COSTING!
DESIGN
COMPLETELY IN
BALANCE WITH
SPECIFICATION

Etc., ...
FIGURE

1.7 Design Core 17
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You'll notice two things. First, there are bidirectio.nal arrows, which indicate conversation between subsequent stages. Of course, the small size of
these arrows relative to the whole seems to suggest that cross-level conversations are at best concessions and at worst interruptions to the overall
march toward production, shown by the thick, black downward arrows.
Second, the parameters-what Pugh will later call "design boundaries"are not only rankable, they have been given clear ranking (A through
G, "in order of importance"). But of course, in the real world things are
much messier than this. All "stages" have feedback into all other stages.
And rankings of design boundaries can only be definitively completed
retrospectively. That means it is artificial to say when one stage ends and
another begins. Of course, without identifiable stages, the diagram falls
apart and ceases to teach anything at all. So the diagram may hint at design
as a regular process, but design doesn't really happen this way.
Oddly enough, designers seem to get along just fine despite inhabiting an undiagrammable situation. Real-world design is not straight-line,
or even bidirectional; it is "loopy:' There are iterations of conversations
between various stages. However, these iterations are not inherently convergent, like iterations of the algorithm for calculating the square root of
2. Successive iterations of the square root algorithm give an increasingly
precise answer. But in the design process, sometimes further iterations of
conversations between stages corrupt, even ruin, a good design. Consequently, teams need to figure out when to stop iterating. But the "time to
stop" is itself a metric whose optimum cannot be spelled out in advance.
Messy, yes?
In addition to the linearity implied about design, there is a second
danger lurking in the oversimple diagram. Such diagrams make it look as
though the terms in which the project is negotiated are clear to everyone at
each step along the way. Obviously, there will be disagreements to be sorted out. But the diagram makes it appear that the terms of negotiation are
understood by each player: "What problem are we solving? What are we
making? How will it function? What metrics ought to be optimized? What
issues are open for negotiation? Who has what stake in the outcome?"
And so on. But answers to these questions are all achieved - sometimes
very slowly and painfully-over time.
So, what is design really like? Perhaps design is a bit like a medieval
quest, like the search for the Holy Grail. With only the vaguest of ideas
about what is sought (What's a "grail"?), a team of relative strangers, whose
powers- both singly and together- are untested or uncertain, launch off
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in some direction. Along the way tests will be faced that will prove mettle,
hone skills, clarify what they seek, and reveal how best to keep seeking.
A map (or "diagram") could only be constructed retrospectively, after the
deed is done. In other words, even if a map had been available at the outset
of the quest, the nature of a quest is such that, on the front end of the journey, the questers would have been as mystified by the map as they were
by the journey itself. (If a group knows where they are going, how to get
there, and what they are after, we say they are taking a "trip" rather than
going on a quest.) And perhaps engineers often enough require "trips"
rather than quests. But we must stay open to the possibility that engineering design often has a quest-like character in order to learn what this is.
The real world is messy. As wonderful and powerful as mathematics
and the hard sciences are, they do not perfectly describe the actual world
we live in. We live in the messy one. And engineers make the amazing
progress they do by remembering that it isn't the real world that approximates math and science. Rather, math and science are the approximations.
Don't misw1derstand: math and science are the very best approximations
we can possibly have. In fact, we ought to work hard to mathematically
model not only, say, general principles of kinematics, but also all the imperfections involved, such as acceleration (dv!dt) and friction (f.l-) and so
on. And of course, advanced models do begin to account for these deviations. rs But the important difference between scientists and engineers is
that whereas science aspires to express an ideal world, engineers use both
math and science as tools for approximating the real world we actually
live in. That is why the final bar for the engineer is never a theory or a
mathematical model, but "look and see": Does it work? Does it work well
enough? This is not to say that idealized models ought to be completely
ignored. Most often, an ideal picture clears the workspace for design; proposals that defy the ideal picture do not even make it onto the table. Most
often- but not always. For there are cases in which engineering precedes
science. James Watt had a functioning steam engine long before the first
thermodynamics text was written. And centuries before Bernoulli, Eilmer
of Malmesbury glided six hundred feet wearing homemade bird's wings! L9
(He was quite possibly the only one ever to succeed. Sadly, he broke both
legs in landing and remained crippled the rest of his life.) An infamous
episode in the history of civil engineering illustrates the bewitching mystique of the ideal picture.
Early in the twentieth century, road building, like many other fields
in engineering, depended on a "look-and-see" approach. That is, the
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skilled eye and trained hand of the experienced practitioner constituted
an "empirically derived understanding of nature:' 20 In other words, what
counted as expertise inside civil engineering resided in the know-how of
the expert practitioner. Unfortunately, what outsiders wanted was numerical proof. 2 1 Without "proof" people mistook engineering for a "low-tech"
enterprise, forever destined to be less respectable than the more quantitative and "scientific" fields such as electricity (for which the mathematical
ideal governs more closely). Some civil engineers felt the urge to "keep up
with the Joneses" and tried to justify the expertise they already possessed
in their fingertips by collecting numerical data to prove to outsiders what
they themselves already knew. This turned out to be a wild goose chase.
So, for a time, the federal Bureau of Public Roads (BPR) scrapped the
field-testing of new road materials and designs. Rather, they moved the
data gathering into a controlled lab environment in the search for repeatable numerical results. For example, the BPR devised a complex machine
for simulating the way a truck pounds pavement. The device numerically
measured the impact made by a heavy weight falling two inches (the sort
of blow a truck delivers when it drives off a two-inch plank). The device
was then complexified to simulate any size truck. Yet in order to keep
the experiment properly "scientific;' only one variable (weight of vehicle,
height of drop, thickness of pavement, the type of underlying soil, etc.)
could be altered per trial. After months, even years, of testing, the BPR had
collected exhaustive data- but only for a single kind of subsoil! Drainage
of the soil was not even on the radar. Nor was the effect of the recoil action
of truck springs initially considered. Still, federal road builders doggedly
followed the BPR data and began constructing roadways that were thick at
the center- where the wheels touched most often-and thin at the edges.
Fortunately, a number of states, perhaps too poor to afford the equipment and too much in a hurry to wait for yet more federal experiments,
simply laid down sixty-eight sections of road, each about fifty yards long,
with various designs, thicknesses, materials, soils, and drainage patterns,
and then assigned a fleet of trucks (from 2,500- 13,500 lbs.) to drive on it
nonstop. Eventually, fifty of the sections were pounded into failure. The
surviving eighteen sections were deemed superior designs. Some of the
results were intuitive (e.g., concrete outperformed brick). But one result
was startling: the best road design was one that was thick at the edges and
thin in the middle, the very opposite of the conclusion demanded by BPR's
theoretical ideal.
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The lesson to be learned? Don't succumb to the bewitchment of
thinking you have the ideal answer. In an ideal picture, or an idealized
model, there is always the implication that if we look hard enough, we'll
find the single correct solution. But in the messy world, things are different. This is not to say that anything goes. In the absence of a single correct
solution, we are not thereby free to do whatever pleases or amuses us.
No! Some proposals are clearly wrong. (For example, those that simply do
not work or cannot be built.) However, there may be more than one right
solution. In all fields of engineering the activity taken in response to the
messiness of the actual world, when no answer is to be found in the back
of the book, is the real field of engineering design.

CONVERSATION

Is

CRUCIAL TO DESIGN

In this book we shall discover that engineering ethics is analogous to realworld engineering design . There is no substitute for actually doing design
work en route to learning what design is. But short of field experience,
we shall have to rely on the observations of those who have taken the
trouble to "look and see:' Louis Bucciarelli, professor at MIT, has done just
that. After shadowing three different teams doing three unique projects
for three separate firms, Bucciarelli was able to spell out why design was
neither straight-line nor ideal. His short answer is that design is a social
enterprise that at its core is a conversation spoken in a language of its own
invention. How thoroughly does conversation impinge on good design?
On Bucciarelli's view, to the extent that designers talk unwillingly or incompletely, design will inevitably succumb to entropy, or "design degradation:' We know that degradation certainly enters through manufacturing
stages of engineering. 22 But Bucciarelli observed that degradation can
result not only from short cuts in manufacturing, but also at the design
table. This is plausible if we remember that designers are neither omniscient nor morally perfect. Perhaps one designer unwittingly competes
with others. 23 Or perhaps another's emphasis on cost reduction conflicts
with someone else's goal of going green. Only in the classroom does the assigning of weights for evaluation happen a priori (which is to say, prior to
looking and seeing). In the real world these metrics must be negotiated. 24
Sometimes these negotiations are both risky and painful. 25
Depending upon student maturity, design may be introduced to the
students by any number of helpful first-order approximations: there are
straight-line models, ones that describe overlapping phases, ones governed
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by computational algorithms, and so on. Whatever pedagogical model is
employed, novice students first encounter "design" in the abstract, cut off
from actual persons who do actual design work. But real-world engineering design doesn't happen in the abstract any more than it happens by
itself. So, engineering students must graduate to the realization that design
is something that people do. It doesn't make sense to talk about "design''
without at the same time talking about people. Each person at the table
brings his or her unique blend of skills to the task. But people also complicate things.
Bucciarelli observed that at the outset, each designer, whatever the
team, conceives the to-be-completed "object" in ways that differ from her
compatriots. In Bucciarelli's words, each team member inhabits her own
"object world:' The activity of design means bringing our object worlds
together by talking long enough until the worlds begin to blend. But at the
outset, team members are almost consigned to speak foreign languages
with each other. 26
Perhaps Plato can help us understand Bucciarelli's point. Plato once
told a parable about blind persons each describing one part of an elephant
by touch and then drawing conclusions about the whole elephant! Feeling
a stout leg: "This beast is like a tree!" Feeling the long nose: "This beast
is like a snake!" The same sort of thing might happen if each participant
spoke a different language in addition to being blind. It would take a very
long time to come to terms if everyone were describing the elephant's parts
spoke a different language. But Bucciarelli is not talking about French or
English. He isn't even thinking about different dialects. He is referring to
sublanguages within English. Since none of us know the half-million or so
words in the English language, it seems likely that entire conversations go
on without us being able to understand a single sentence. So, there may
be many, many more sublanguages that might be in play than we might
first imagine. Still, it's hard to believe Bucciarelli when he says that even
within a design firm, like IDEO or OXO, each designer speaks a language
unique to her. But perhaps the best policy for our investigation is to "look
and see:'
For example, in the now famous five-day redesign of a shopping cart,
the design firm IDEO utilized a team in which engineers were outnumbered
by non-engineers (such as linguists, biologists, marketers, psychologists,
etc.). Some will say that IDEO takes this mixed sublanguage approach to
the extreme. But Bucciarelli observes that the multiple-languages problem
plays out even in ordinary engineering firms in which every designer is
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an engineer by training. 27 While both electrical engineers and mechanical
engineers have taken calculus, electrical engineers inhabit a quite different object world than do mechanical engineers. Here is a simple example:
"resistance" means one thing when talking about a gear train and another
when talking about an electronic circuit.
The challenge of a team's eventually achieving fully functional communication about design- whether the intended artifact is a shopping cart
or a large-scale real-time X-ray inspection machine- is not easy. Getting
everyone on the same page is not a simple compromise over vocabulary.
Nor did Bucciarelli observe designers using a fat dictionary to translate
from X's world to Y's and from Y's to Z's. Rather, in the world of design, a
team evolves its own unique sublanguage. Bucciarelli reports that this often
is "a matter of convention and custom;' involving "curious practices and
forms of expression as well as tokens and grammar, jargon and idiom;'
not to mention sketches, analogies, metaphors, models, and prototypes. 28
In short, the design team evolves its own mother tongue.29 And the only
way to learn it is by immersion. One has to participate in design in order
to become fluent. This may take time, but achieving fluency is worth it.
Granted, designers probably won't describe their gains in terms of "fluencY:' But they will notice that their work with each other has begun to
"click:'
Here are some of Bucciarelli's observations on the way design
work "clicks;' which is to say, the way designers evolve their own design
language. 30
1.

The language spoken by the team becomes somewhat "self-contained:'
Outsiders to the team do not have an automatic ability to understand
what the team is talking about without direct participation in the
group. In fact, early on designers quickly discover that direct translation from each proper object language to another (say from electrical
engineering to marketing) is simply not possible. Consequently, in
order for one designer to communicate to her peers, she must resort
to vernacular rather than her own technical object-world languageY

2.

Outsiders find that the best way to learn the team's evolving language
is to approach it like a foreign language and learn fluency by immersion. Granted, some of the language is codified in handbooks, standards, and textbooks that are widely accessible to outsiders. (Thus, for
example, as a bicycle racer I shared a small overlapping understanding with mechanical engineers who designed the bike and technicians
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who kept it running.) But these "canons" are not exhaustive. (Even if
they were exhaustive, a book couldn't tell one which vernacular use
of a term [e.g., "resistance"] is in play. You may have already met this
phenomenon while reading the history of science. Compare early
modern conceptions of "ether" with CH30CH 3, or late nineteenthcentury definitions of "force" with F =rna.) Some of what makes for
"good" design in the task at hand cannot be understood except as the
language is learned on location by means of the hands-on activity of
designing.
3.

As might be expected, mathematics shows up a lot in technical object
worlds. However, Bucciarelli observed that the mathematics of one
designer's "world" only resembles the math of another world, since
the particulars to which math is applied may comprise distinct sublanguages. Bluntly put, mathematics is not the universal language; it is
more like the precondition for learning to speak.

4.

A design team's language is fluid. On the one hand, it is settled enough
to give direction to the flow of the conversation. But like a riverbed
that is ever shifting, so too the boundaries of a given design language
may drift over time. 32 For example, a feature that yesterday exemplified "good" design may today be discarded by the design team for
other meanings of"good:'

5.

No one person is a privileged elite with a god's-eye view or superior
fluency that encompasses all the sublanguages spoken. "Fluency" in
the object language of this design team is something achieved by everybody on the team, albeit haltingly. The team as a whole achieves
fluency in their locally evolving sublanguage as each member struggles to make her unique ideas intelligible by means of conversations,
shouting matches, e-mails, diagrams, sketches on napldns, etc.

6.

Words-both ordinary and specialized vocabulary- are obviously
crucial for mastering an evolving design language. But equally important are sketches, prototypes, heuristics, metaphors, hands-on experience, and tacit know-how. Surprisingly, mathematical models are often idealized and thus leave off the very particulars that are needed for
gaining tacit know-how of the object world. As a result, mathematical
equations and technical drawings can supplement but never displace
the need for rough-and-ready, garden-variety words.

So we see that design involves both the ideal and the rough. In the
main, design is something like learning to communicate with foreigners
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without help of a dictionary. Design is decidedly not the straightforward
application of an ideal picture.

CONCLUSION

If design were governed by an ideal, it is conceivable that every design
team that responded to a RFP (request for proposal) would generate identical solutions. The likelihood that each of us has met insufferable know-itails who treat their own design proposal as the only one logically possible
does not change the reality that design is as unpredictable as it is messy.
The outcome of design activity is not like cranking the gear train in Figure
1.1 and asking for the location of Pw Another turn of the crank results
in a fully predictable result. Rather, design work undertaken in response
to a new problem turns out to be messy business. And as Bucciarelli has
shown, design is as messy a business as learning to cross the communication gaps created by the existence of as many object worlds as there are
team members!
From Bucciarelli's record of his work shadowing the three design
teams actually practicing design, one lesson that emerges is the need for
a certain kind of personal character. In particular, there is the need for a
basic level of trust among designers on a team. 33 It is only on the basis of
a very primitive trust that children are able to learn language from their
parents. So, too, designers must trust in each other. In addition, they must
trust in the common nature of the way the world works even when that
cannot be exhaustively spelled out. Because, after all, design is this team's
way of dealing with their world just as engineering as a whole is the human means for dealing with the messy world. In short, design is a social

process for coping with the messy world. 31

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1.

Does mathematics approximate the world or does the world approximate mathematics? Why?

2.

What are the two most common forms that consequentialism takes?

3.

Under what conditions is the consequentialist formula most useful
for decision-making in ethics? What are the limits of this formula?
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4.

What does Bucciarelli mean by the term "object worlds"? What do
you gather Bucciarelli means by saying each design team evolves its
own language?

5. Why do you think one has to participate in design in order best to
learn it?

NOTES

I.

Live footage of the incident can be viewed on YouTube.com, e.g.,
http://www. youtube.com/watch ?v=osocGiofdvc.

2.

The diagrams of gear trains and sprocket arrangements was done with
the help ofBingjue Lion a CAD program called "Inventor:'

3.

My guide in these matters is frequently the engineer-turned-philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein. He was very concerned with a certain
blindness we develop when we look at the world around us. "The
machine (its structure) as symbolizing its action: the action of a
machine-I might say at first-seems to be there in it from the start.
What does that mean?"If we know the machine, everything else, that is its movement,
seems to be already completely determined.
"We talk as if these parts could only move in this way, as if they
could not do anything else. How is this- do we forget the possibility
of their bending, breaking off, melting, and so on? Yes; in many cases
we don't think of that at all:' Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations,
§193.

4. This spectacular debacle is recounted in Ferguson, "How Engineers
Lose Touch;' 16-24.
5.

This may seem overly simplified. But notice that if the goodness of an
outcome is mixed, both good and bad, the outcome must be broken
down into component parts that are each either entirely good or entirely bad.

6.

In this book I'll use the terms "chaos" and "complexity" to refer to the
irreducible and systematic unpredictability that tmderlies all the apparent mathematical regularities of the physical world we live in. The
fact that we cannot exhaustively predict future events except statistically (pace the popular television series Numbers) means that humans
live in a contingent world. For further reading see Russell, Murphy,
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and Peacocke, Chaos and Complexity. See also Juarerro, Dynamics in
Action; Mitchell, Unsimple Truths.
7.

The French mathematician Henri Poincare showed that even in simple linear systems like billiard balls colliding, an error in the nth decimal place leads to total uncertainty after n collisions. "Linear" does
not mean "traveling in straight lines;' although billiard balls tend to
do this. "Linear" here means solvable with simple algebra. Conservation of momentum, equations using mv, does not require differential
equations to solve. See Polkinghorne, Science and Providence, 28- 29.
Systems of physical measurement inevitably run up against
Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. Given Planck's constant, Poincare's work leads to the conclusion that linear systems- those solvable
by simple algebra rather than differential equations- become entirely
unpredictable after something on the order of 30-40 or so collisions.
How then do Rube Goldberg devices worlc? (For example, see Honda's
"The Cog": http:/ /www.youtube.com/watch ?v=_ ve4M4Us]Qo.) I suspect that such devices have moments of "re-start"; rather than being
actual pre-predicted chains of 50+ collisions, they are groups of shorter chains, each ending with a binary event rather than a continuation
of the series. For example, a good pool player may be able to regularly
pocket a ball after three collisions. The pocketing completes the chain.
The act of falling into the pocket is not unpredictable as if instead of
falling into the pocket, a fourth precise collision needs to happen.

8.

The details of this case are easy to find. See, for example, Hoffman,
"Ford Pinto:'

9.

The conversion factor for 1978 dollars is 0.314. Inflation adjustment
data from the Web site maintained by Oregon State University: http:/ I
oregons tate.ed u/ cia/ polisci/ individual-year -conversion-factor- tables.

10. The numbers vary: the federal Transportation Department uses a figure close to $6 million, whereas the FDA has declared a life was worth
$7.9 million. Appelbaum, "As U.S ..Agencies Put More Value on a Life,
Businesses Fret:' See also Fahrenthold, "Cosmic Markdown:'
11. This story has precedent. The Neem tree has been used for centuries
by continental Indians as a pesticide. In 1992 W. R. Grace tried to
establish a patent on the active ingredient derived from Neem, azadirachtin. See Severance, Spiro, and Werhane, "W. R. Grace & Co. and
the Neemix Patent (a);' 399- 409.
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12. Perhaps the most famous of these involves a botanist named Jim who
stumbles upon a village in the Amazon basin while looking for flowers. "Jim finds himself in the central square of a small South American
town. Tied up against the wall are a row of twenty Indians, most terrified, a few defiant, in front of them several armed men in uniform. A
heavy man in a sweat-stained khaki shirt turns out to be the captain in
charge and, after a good deal of questioning of Jim which establishes
that he got there by accident while on a botanical expedition, explains
that the Indians are a random group of inhabitants who, after recent
acts of protest against the government, are just about to be killed to
remind other possible protestors of the advantage of not protesting. However, since Jim is an honored visitor from another land, the
captain is happy to offer him a guest's privilege of killing one of the
Indians himself. If Jim accepts, then as a special mark of the occasion,
the other Indians will be let off. Of course, ifJim refuses, then there is
no special occasion, and Pedro here will do what he was about to do
when Jim arrived, and kill them all. Jim, with some desperate recollection of schoolboy fiction, wonders whether if he got hold of a gun,
he could hold the captain, Pedro, and the rest of the soldiers to threat,
but it is quite clear from the setup that nothing of that kind is going to
work: any attempt at that sort of thing will mean that all the Indians
will be killed, and himself. The men against the wall, and the other
villagers understand the situation, and are obviously begging him to
accept. What should he do?" Yikes! Cited in Pojman, Ethical Theory,
191-92. See also Mulhall, "Mortality of the Soul;' 355- 79.
13. Remember that mathematical "laws" are unattainable asymptotes for
real machines. As such, math approximates reality and not the other
way around. Math is at best a "rule of thumb" for real-world problems.
More on this in chapter 3.
14. We will later consider his more complete definition: "the engineering
method is the use of heuristics to cause the best change in a poorly
understood situation within the available resources:' Koen, Discussion of the Method, 9, 28.
15. Adapted from the diagram by Hill, Science of Engineering Design, 49.
Notice that the book's title pairs engineering with "science" rather
than the older understanding of engineering as an art form. Ars mechanicus will be explored in chapter 10.

28

The Messy World We Inhabit
16. Despite drawing the specious analogy between design and the scientific method, Hill does note that, perhaps unlike science, design
requires the iteration of some steps along the way. See ibid., 36-38.
Similarly, Stuart Pugh acknowledges bidirectional feedback between
stages of design . However, Pugh downplays this give and take on
grounds that feedback diminishes as design progresses. See Pugh,
Creating Innovative Products Using Total Design, 267- 68.

17. Compiled from various diagrams used by Pugh over the course of his
lifetime. See Pugh.
18. However, even here we must be careful. Modelers cannot account for
all the imperfections. Every computer model divvies up reality into
chunks in order to make the calculations manageable. It is precisely
here that engineers are in danger, when they forget to consider the
modeler's assumptions. See Ferguson, "How Engineers Lose Touch:'
19. White, "Eilmer of MalmesburY:'
20. Seely, "Scientific Mystique;' 675- 702.
21. For an account of math used rhetorically, see Seife, Proofiness.
22. For example, the Boston Tunnel was originally designed to be tiled
with metal-plated porcelain. Unfortunately, this expensive tile was
substituted with cheaper, but much heavier, concrete ones. Fan1ously,
five three-ton ceiling sections failed and crushed a car, killing a woman on her way to the airport. Wald, "Late Design Change:'
23. Amelie Rorty has written a clever satire showing how blindness sets in
among team members. See her "How to Harden Your Heart:'

24. Bucciarelli, Engineering Philosophy, 20.
25. Ibid., 14. For a much more technical account of design discourse, see
Bucciarelli, "Between Thought and Object;' 219- 31.
26. "... different forms of expressions go hand in hand with different ways
of thinking about the world, about the existence of conceptual entities- their ontological status- and about the meaning and scope of
the principles and requirements of the different paradigmatic sciences
that frame thought and practice within object worlds. My framing of
design as a social process in which different participants work within
different object worlds which, in some restricted sense are incommensurable worlds, leads me to claim they speak different languages:'
Bucciarelli, Engineering Philosophy, 15. Whew! That's a mouthful. By
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the way, why do professors write in such a complicated fashion? Might
it be that sometimes profound or complex ideas can only be expressed
in profound or complex ways? Could you explain differential equations to a ten-year-old?
27. Bucciarelli writes about three firms he shadows and their three respective design problems: a photovoltaic array for lighting highways
in Saudi Arabia, a problem of dropout in quality for images of a high
quantity photo-printer, and an X-ray machine for inspecting large
cargo crates. Bucciarelli, Designing Engineers.
28. Bucciarelli, Engineering Philosophy, 15.
29. ". .. object world language is a proper language:' Ibid., 16.
30. Ibid., 16- 21.

31. In Bucciarelli's terms, "object worlds are incommensurable:' Ibid., 20.
32. Wittgenstein, On Certainty, §§99, 97, 256.
33. This kind of trust toward others is one example of what Danish ethicist Knud L0gstrup called "the sovereign expressions of life:' Or what
John Howard Yoder called working "with the grain of the universe:'
Hauerwas, With the Grain of the Universe; L0gstrup, Ethical Demand.

34. "Different participants with different responsibilities, competencies
and interests, speak different languages when working, for the most
part alone, in their respective domains (electrical circuits, kinematics,
linguistics, psychology, and so on). For this to ring true, we ought
to construe language in the broadest terms- to include the sketch,
the prototype, the charts, even a computer algorithm as elements employed in the productive exchange among participants. But individual
effort within some disciplinary matrix does not suffice: Designing is a
social process; it requires exchange and negotiation as well as intense
work within object worlds." Bucciarelli, Engineering Philosophy, 21.
Emphasis added.
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